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Are All Insider Sales Created Equal?  
Evidence from Form 4 Footnote Disclosures 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper is the first to examine the information contained in executives’ voluntary 
supplementary disclosures in footnotes on SEC Form 4 filings that accompany 
stock sales. Analysing these supplementary disclosures we are able to distinguish 
between discretionary sales, for which insiders have discretion over the amount and 
timing of the sale, and nondiscretionary sales. We find that discretionary sales 
involve significantly larger trades and produce significantly lower abnormal 
announcement returns than nondiscretionary sales, particularly when internal 
controls are perceived to be weak. Our findings suggests that discretionary sales 
reveal negative information to investors who do not seem to fully impound the 
information into stock prices in a timely manner as these sales are predictive of 
negative future stock returns. Investigating the type of bad news that these insider 
sales predict, we find a positive association with the likelihood of future analyst 
downgrades, negative earnings surprises and future litigation.  
 
 
Keywords: Insider sales; Form 4 filings; voluntary disclosure; footnotes; 
information content 
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1. Introduction 
Insiders trade for a variety of reasons. While there has been empirical evidence consistent with 
the notion that insiders buy their own firm’s shares ahead of good news (Lakonishok and Lee, 
2001; Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser, 2003), evidence on the information content of insider 
sales is more mixed (Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Brochet 2010; Jagolinzer, 
Larcker and Taylor 2011). One frequently mentioned reason why prior studies on the 
information content of insider sales produce mixed results is the difficulty to distinguish 
genuine liquidity-motivated sales from information-based trades. 
On the one hand, insiders might sell shares for liquidity reasons such as to cover taxes, 
for personal reasons, or due to diversification needs. This is particularly relevant for executives 
and directors as their wealth is often highly concentrated in their firm. On the other hand, given 
the insider’s preferential access to firm-specific information, a sale might signal an insider’s 
private information of future bad news about the firm (Seyhun and Bradley 1997; Beneish, 
Press and Vargus 2004). However, the true motives for an insider’s stock sale are often 
unobservable by outside investors, complicating any efforts to disentangle the true nature of an 
insider’s selling activity and to identify those sales that are informative.1  
Identifying information-based insider sales is particularly important to outside investors 
as managers generally delay disclosing bad news (Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal 2005; 
Kothari, Shu and Wysocki 2009) and there are few other capital market mechanisms that reveal 
                                                          
1 Anecdotal examples from the press illustrate the difficulty in identifying informative insider sales. In one case 
the Chief Accounting Officer of American Realty Capital Properties sold a considerable amount of stock prior 
to news of an accounting scandal at the company. According to SEC filings, the sale related to restricted stock 
that had to be forfeited and was sold at a price of 0 because the officer was dismissed. Another case discusses 
executives at Body Central Corp that sold stock as part of a pre-planned 10b5-1 set up in prior years. The sales 
were executed just one day prior to an earnings warning, which resulted in a 48% stock price decline. The 
former case, a priori, might have seemed like an information-based trade and the fact that the latter was part of a 
pre-planned trade made it seem like a liquidity trade. See for example, “Not All Insider Trading is Created 
Equally”, Forbes, October 31, 2014; “Executives’ Good Luck in Trading Own Stock,” Wall Street Journal, 
November 27, 2012; “When Insiders Sell,” Forbes, May 5, 2009. 
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negative information about a firm.2 Moreover, managers might have incentives to “pump and 
dump” their shares (Bar-Gill and Bebchuk 2002; Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong 2006); and 
there is ample empirical evidence that managers exploit their information advantage 
strategically when disclosing material non-public information (Aboody and Kasznik 2000; 
Lang and Lundholm 2000; Nagar, Nanda and Wysocki 2003; Brockman, Khurana and Martin 
2008). However, likely because of the higher scrutiny and legal restrictions insiders face when 
selling shares and the increased litigation risk associated with insider sales, researchers have 
failed to establish strong links between insiders’ disclosure of positive news that precede stock 
sales or the revelation of negative news immediately following stock sales (Noe 1999; Cheng 
and Lo 2006; Ke, Huddart and Petroni 2003).3 If at all, managers thus seem to exploit their 
information advantage in more subtle ways when engaging in insider trades. 
In this paper, we directly examine the information insiders disclose about the reasons for 
their trades on filings with the SEC. In doing so, our paper is the first to extract and analyse 
insiders’ voluntary supplementary disclosures in footnotes on SEC Form 4. Although these 
footnotes often contain generic boilerplate disclosures, they also mention the reasons for the 
stock sale such as personal (liquidity) needs to cover tax liabilities, tuition fees for children, 
divorce settlements, etc., or that the sale was part of a 10b5-1 plan under safe harbour 
provisions.  
Prior research suggests that managers voluntarily disclose information to reduce 
information asymmetries (Verrecchia 1983; Brown, Hillegeist and Lo 2004) and to avoid 
litigation costs (Skinner 1994), but are reluctant to disclose if it reduces their private benefits 
(Nagar, Nanda and Wysocki 2003). Hutton, Miller and Skinner (2003) show that 
                                                          
2 There are often significant constraints to short sales (Diamond and Verrecchia 1987; Beneish, Lee and Nichols 
2015) and information intermediaries, such as analysts, are generally reluctant to cover underperforming firms 
or issue downgrades (McNichols and O’Brien 1997; O’Brien, McNichols and Lin 2005). 
3 Consistent with the litigation avoidance hypothesis Ke, Huddart and Petroni (2003), for example, show that 
insiders increase their selling of shares up to two years prior to a break in a string of consecutive earnings 
growth, but not in the two quarters immediately prior to the break. 
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supplementary disclosures to earnings forecasts support the credibility of these forecasts and 
are informative to investors. In a similar vein, the purpose of supplementary footnote 
disclosures by insiders during stock sales might be to credibly convey that these sales are made 
for liquidity or diversification reasons and have no information value. Particularly in the case 
of insider sales, not disclosing the motives for the sale might lead market participants to pool 
information-based and liquidity-based sales and to interpret all sales as negative news for a 
given stock. Moreover, Narayanam (2000) argues that insiders are more likely to sell while 
they delay the disclosure of bad news. Hence insider sales of stock might be regarded as bad 
news especially when there is a lack of disclosure regarding their reasons. In such cases, 
investors may interpret sales as occurring for any reason other than liquidity needs. 
Yet, even when disclosing the reasons for the sale, insiders might exploit the fact that 
outside investors have difficulties distinguishing insider sales that are genuinely made due to 
liquidity needs or for diversification reasons from those that, while potentially serving liquidity 
needs, may also contain information value. This is because insiders might have considerable 
discretion over the timing and the amount of liquidity-based trades (Jagolinzer 2009), might 
bundle liquidity-based and information-based sales (Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser 2003), or 
might disguise information-based sales as trades for liquidity reasons.4 Alternatively, it is also 
possible that outside investors do not pay enough attention to footnote disclosures that 
accompany insider sales and falsely assume all sales to be information-based. 
The research question we address in this study is therefore whether supplementary 
disclosures in Form 4 footnotes that accompany insiders’ stock sales are informative to 
investors; and whether these disclosures enable investors to distinguish sales that contain 
information value from genuine liquidity-motivated and uninformative sales. Specifically, 
                                                          
4 There is, however, a large number of firms that voluntarily implement insider trading policies that might limit 
the extent of the discretion over the timing of sales, e.g., by limiting trading windows to within a certain amount 
of days after earnings announcements (Bettis, Coles and Lemmon 2000).    
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based on whether a footnote is disclosed and based on the textual content of these footnotes, 
we classify each insider sale into what we label Discretionary and Nondiscretionary. In 
particular, the key distinguishing factor of Discretionary versus Nondiscretionary Footnote is 
whether, based on the disclosed nature of the trade in the footnotes to Form 4, the insider has 
discretion over timing and amount of the sale.5  
We begin by identifying Nondiscretionary Footnotes. These are footnote disclosures that 
describe stock sales for which the insider has no discretion over the amount or timing. Such 
footnotes might contain explanations such as: “[…] sale of additional shares to cover personal 
federal income tax obligation.” or “[…] shares automatically sold by company on behalf of 
employee in conjunction with company's deferred compensation plan.” The first example 
describes stocks sold to cover the tax liability of restricted stock grants. The US tax code 
requires executives to pay income tax on restricted stock at the time of the grant or vesting 
dates, both of which are decided by the company. To cover the tax due insiders usually sell 
stock or instruct the company to withhold and sell part of their restricted stock on behalf of 
them on these dates.6 The second example refers to stock sales by the company on behalf of 
the insider as part of their deferred compensation plan. In both cases, the insider either has no 
control over the amount or the timing of the trade (or both). We follow the same criteria when 
interpreting other Form 4 footnotes.7 
On the other hand, an insider sale with a Discretionary Footnote might contain a footnote 
explanation such as: “[…] shares sold to diversify investments.”  or “[…] sale pursuant to 
                                                          
5 We explain our classification methodology in detail in section 2 and the parsing methodology of the footnotes 
in section 3. 
6 Insiders could of course choose to pay the income tax of restricted stock grants with cash instead of giving up 
part of the restricted stock when they believe the value will rise in the future. In contrast they will more likely 
choose to sell stock if they believe the stock will decline in value, e.g., if they possess negative non-public 
information about the future prospects of their firm. If this was the case, however, it would bias against us 
finding that nondiscretionary sales have no information value.  
7 We provide a full list of examples of the footnote disclosures we classify as Discretionary and 
Nondiscretionary in the appendix. 
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distribution of marital assets in divorce settlement.” These footnote examples describe shares 
sold by the insider with the intent to diversify their investment or to cover the costs of a divorce 
settlement. In both cases, the insider has discretion over the timing and the amount of the sale. 
Given the abovementioned incentives to disclose, we separately also include sales that omit 
any supplementary disclosures in the discretionary category and label the combined category 
Discretionary Trade.8  
This classification scheme allows us to distinguish the nature of insider sales using 
information publicly available to investors at the time of the filing of the SEC Form 4. The key 
is that our classification scheme only relies on the descriptions in Form 4 footnotes that 
objectively identify nondiscretionary insider sales, i.e., those sales for which (for technical or 
other reasons) the insider had no discretion over the amount or timing of the trade. All other 
sales are classified as discretionary. Using this classification scheme we analyse over two 
million available insider transactions filed with the SEC in 2003-2011 and collapse them to 
over 180,000 firm-day insider sales observations.  
Our findings are as follows: Insider sales which contain a Discretionary Footnote are on 
average almost nine times the size of sales with a Nondiscretionary Footnote measured in 
percentage of shares outstanding. In dollar terms, discretionary insider trades on average 
amount to US $6.7 million compared to US $1.2 million for nondiscretionary sales. 
Furthermore, insider sales without any explanatory footnote are also on average almost twice 
the size of those with a nondiscretionary footnote. 
We find that there is a significant difference in cumulative abnormal returns between 
trade filings that include footnotes and those that do not, and between those with footnotes that 
describe discretionary and nondiscretionary sales. Three-day cumulative abnormal Form 4 
                                                          
8 Specifically, we label as Discretionary Trade all insider sales that do not contain a footnote or that contain a 
discretionary footnote, i.e., a footnote that, based on the textual description, suggests the sale occurred for 
discretionary reasons.  
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filing returns to Discretionary Trades are 32-36 basis points lower than returns to 
nondiscretionary insider sales. This differential is even higher when we omit sales that contain 
no supplementary information from the discretionary category and becomes even larger at -
1.31% for discretionary sales executed by the top two executives, the CEO and CFO, who most 
likely have the largest information advantage (Ravina and Sapienza 2010; Wang, Shin and 
Francis 2012). We further find the differential market reaction to be higher for firms that are 
exempt from SOX reporting requirements and are perceived to have weaker internal controls. 
To assess whether investors fully impound the information contained in discretionary 
insider sales into stock prices, we examine their predictive power for long-term stock returns. 
We find monotonically decreasing abnormal returns (and monotonically increasing divergence 
in returns from nondiscretionary trades) over longer-term holding horizons from the month 
after the insider trade. For example, the difference in abnormal returns between discretionary 
and nondiscretionary trades in the month following the insider sale is almost 1.4% suggesting 
that sales classified as discretionary are powerful predictors of future negative stock returns 
and that investors tend to underreact to the information in these footnotes. A trading strategy 
that each month buys a portfolio of stocks with nondiscretionary insider sales and sells a 
portfolio of stocks with discretionary insider sales earns a 16% risk-adjusted return per year. 
To assess whether the negative stock return performance after discretionary insider sales 
is due to the revelation of negative news subsequent to the sale, we examine the predictive 
power of discretionary sales for future negative news events such as analyst recommendation 
downgrades, negative earnings surprises and litigation initiations. We find supporting evidence 
for all three. 
Lastly, we test the robustness of our results by classifying insider sales into opportunistic 
sales based on the insiders’ past trading record as in Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012). Our 
classification into discretionary and nondiscretionary sales based on supplementary disclosures 
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by insiders remains highly predictive and is more informative for future negative stock returns 
than the classification based on the insider’s past trading record. We identify over 23,400 
insider trade months as discretionary that are not classified as opportunistic using Cohen et 
al.’s (2012) classification.  
Our findings demonstrate that executives’ supplementary disclosure on the SEC Form 4 
that contain descriptions of the nature of an insider’s stock sale are highly informative to 
investors. Based on the mere fact whether Form 4 filings contain such supplementary footnotes 
and based on the content of these footnotes, we are able to distinguish informative from 
uninformative insider sales and show that even though insiders describe liquidity reasons for 
the sale of stock these sales in fact contain information value. To our knowledge, our study is 
the first to investigate executives’ supplementary disclosures in Form 4 footnotes. Analysing 
whether and what information is disclosed in these footnotes allows us to identify insider sales 
made for discretionary reasons, which are informative, and nondiscretionary sales, which are 
uninformative to investors.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses our contribution 
to the related literature and describes our classification setting. Section 3 describes the data. 
Section 4 and 5 present the main findings on the information content and predictive power of 
Form 4 footnote disclosures. Section 6 discusses robustness tests and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Contribution and Setting  
2.1. Contribution to the Related Literature 
Prior research on voluntary disclosure and insider sales examines the relationship between 
insider trading and management’s disclosure behaviour prior to or after the insider trade (Noe 
1999; Cheng and Lo 2006), but does not examine disclosure choices that directly accompany 
the insider’s transaction. For example, Noe (1999) finds that insiders tend to sell their firm’s 
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stock after the disclosure of good news and tend to purchase their firm’s shares after the 
disclosure of bad news. Cheng and Lo (2006) show that corporate insiders endogenously decide 
their trading and disclosure timing to maximize private gains, taking into account the risk of 
potential civil litigation. Their study finds a positive association of bad news forecasts with 
expected insider purchases. They find no such relationship for good news forecasts and insider 
sales and attribute this to the higher litigation risk associated with insider sales. 
The prior literature on strategic disclosure finds that insider trading is correlated with the 
disclosure timing and management of earnings numbers (e.g., Beneish and Vargus 2002; 
Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Cheng and Lo 2006). More recent evidence in Jagolinzer 
(2009) extends this line of research focusing on pre-planned trades under the safe harbour 
provisions of SEC rule 10b5-1. Jagolinzer (2009) shows that 10b5-1 plans are used strategically 
to hide private rent extraction through insider trades.  
We contribute to this stream of the literature by finding that supplementary disclosures 
by insiders on SEC Form 4 filings, despite describing liquidity-motivated sales, in fact are 
highly informative about future negative news on the stock, and that investors only partially 
impound that information into stock prices in a timely manner. 
Early research on the information content of insider trading finds that insiders trade on 
their information advantage and, on average, earn abnormal returns subsequent to stock 
purchases (Jaffe 1974; Finnerty 1976; Rozeff and Zaman 1988). Research on the information 
content of insider sales, however, has produced mixed results due to the fact that insiders might 
sell stocks for a variety of liquidity and institutional reasons masking any average effect of 
information-based sales (Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jeng, Metrick and 
Zeckhauser, 2003). Lakonishok and Lee (2001), for example, do not find abnormal event study 
returns around the reporting date of insider trades suggesting these trades are uninformative to 
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outside investors. Similarly, Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (2003) report that insider purchases, 
but not insider sales, earn abnormal returns. 
Two strands of the literature have emerged attempting to discriminate between 
informative insider sales and liquidity/diversification-driven sales based on observable trade or 
firm characteristics. One strand of the literature examines the information content of insider 
sales and their predictive power for future stock returns by identifying bad news events ex post. 
The other strand aims to distinguish liquidity-driven insider sales from information-based sales 
through the insiders’ trading behaviour ex ante.   
Among the former, Seyhun and Bradley (1997) document that insiders are more likely to 
sell shares ahead of bankruptcy filings generating private trading gains. Similarly, Beneish 
(1999) examines the association between earnings overstatements and insider sales and finds a 
higher propensity of managers selling shares during the period of earnings manipulation. The 
study suggests that insiders gain from selling shares at inflated prices before the detection of 
the earnings overstatement and the accompanying stock price correction. On the other hand, 
Beneish, Press and Vargus (2004) document a higher likelihood of insiders selling stock before 
they engage in earnings management in order to delay the revelation of bad earnings news. 
Their results suggest that managers attempt to avoid litigation that could arise from selling 
shares just ahead of bad earnings news. They do not find evidence of a higher propensity of 
earnings management before stock sales. Consistent with the litigation avoidance hypothesis 
Ke, Huddart and Petroni (2003) show that insiders increase their selling of shares up to two 
years prior to a break in a string of consecutive earnings growth, but not in the two quarters 
immediately prior to the break.9  
                                                          
9 The gains to insider trading before bad earnings news are not confined to the firm’s executives as shown in 
Ravina and Sapienza (2010). Their study finds that independent directors equally gain from insider sales in 
particular ahead of bad earnings news and earnings restatements, events that the authors use to distinguish 
information-based insider sales from liquidity-based sales. 
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Among the other strand of the literature, Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012) identify 
information-based insider trades by classifying insiders into routine and opportunistic traders 
according to the timing of their trades in relation to their past trading behaviour. Insiders that 
execute their trades in the same calendar month every year for three years are classified as 
routine and their trades are predicted to be uninformative. Their study finds that opportunistic 
trades are predictive of future stock returns and news. In a similar vein, Karamanou, Pownall 
and Prakash (2016) classify insider trades by the insider’s concurrent trading behaviour. Their 
study shows that stock sales in one firm by insiders to multiple firms that occur simultaneously 
with stock purchases in the other affiliated firms are informative and associated with future 
firm performance. 
We contribute to this literature by examining voluntary footnote disclosures by insiders 
that are filed on the Form 4; and we use the description about the nature of the insider trades in 
these footnotes to distinguish discretionary from nondiscretionary sales. We differ from the 
prior literature by discriminating between informative and uninformative insider sales based 
on insiders’ own voluntary supplementary disclosures on the SEC Form 4. These disclosures 
are observable by investors at time of the trade filing and arguably easier to process as 
information signals than disentangling the insiders’ past trading patterns. We find that our 
distinction into discretionary and nondiscretionary sales based on footnote disclosures by 
insiders identifies substantially more trades as informative than, for example, distinguishing by 
the opportunistic timing of the trades as in Cohen et al. (2012). Additionally, our classification 
has incremental explanatory power for future stock returns after controlling for the 
opportunistic timing. 
2.2. The Setting: Form 4 Footnote Disclosures 
With the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 insider trade reporting 
underwent significant changes. Provisions in SOX require insiders to report trades (changes in 
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ownership) to the SEC on the Form 4 within 2 business days following the transaction date 
instead of the 10-day period allowed prior to SOX. Since 2003, the SEC also requires Form 4 
to be filed electronically. Form 4 contains identifying information of the firm and the insider 
as well as transaction information. The form also allows for supplementary information to be 
added in footnotes below the main table alongside the quantitative transaction details. These 
footnotes generally contain textual explanations regarding the nature of the transaction and 
clarifying information with respect to the trade. Insiders often voluntarily state the reasons for 
the sale of common stock in them. The explanations in these footnotes are the main subject of 
interest in this paper. Figure 1 shows an example of a Form 4 that contains such a footnote. 
On the one hand, insiders might disclose the nature of the sale in a footnote, when they 
sell stock for genuine diversification or liquidity reasons, to reduce information asymmetries 
with outside investors as non-disclosure might be interpreted by investors as information-based 
trading ahead of bad news (Verrecchia 1983; Dye 1985); or they might disclose information 
about the nature of the trade to protect themselves against potential allegations of insider 
dealing on material non-public information.  
On the other hand, insiders might disclose footnote information to decrease the likelihood 
that their sales of stock might be perceived as being for reasons other than liquidity needs and 
diversification. Insiders might sell stock for a variety of discretionary and nondiscretionary 
reasons and by pooling these sales into a group that contains qualifying information about the 
nature of the trade, they might attempt to impede the market’s ability to distinguish liquidity 
from information-based trades.10 
To distinguish genuine liquidity from information-based sales we therefore classify each 
insider sale into discretionary and nondiscretionary sales, first, based on whether any 
                                                          
10 Insiders might, however, be reluctant to disclose materially false information on the Form 4, even in a 
voluntarily provided footnote, to avoid higher litigation risk. 
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supplementary information is provided in a footnote on the Form 4 filing and, second, based 
on the textual description in these footnotes. Our key distinguishing factor of discretionary 
versus nondiscretionary sales is, whether, based on the disclosed nature of the trade, the insider 
has discretion over timing and amount of the sale. 
Using these two characteristics, we classify as Nondiscretionary Footnote those that 
describe sales to cover tax obligations related to restricted stock or stock option grants, to 
correct previous errors, and as part of automatic trades other than 10b5-1 trades. Insiders have 
to declare restricted stock as ordinary income and thus become liable for income tax. The US 
tax code allows insiders to elect whether to pay income tax on the vesting date or on the grant 
date. Insiders usually cover the tax due by selling stock or by having the company withhold 
and sell part of their restricted stock on behalf of them on these dates. That is, insiders have no 
control over the amount of taxes due related to the restricted stock and very little discretion 
over the timing.11 Similarly, insiders have no discretion over automated trades that are executed 
by the company for retirement planning purposes, or when they are required to correct errors 
made in prior trades or trade disclosures. We thus argue that these nondiscretionary stock sales 
are likely not informative.  
We classify all other footnotes as Discretionary Footnote. These include footnotes that 
describe the sale as being part of options exercises, a gift, for divorce settlements, tuition 
payments, as part of a retirement plan, or on behalf of family members. There is some evidence 
that such trades include valuable information to outside investors. Berkman, Koch and 
Westerholm (2014), for example, report a number of insider trading cases (in their internet 
appendix) in which guardians traded through accounts of their children in an informed manner.  
                                                          
11 Insiders do however have discretion over whether they cover the taxes by selling stock or using cash. That is, 
insiders might choose to settle the income tax liability with cash instead of selling stock if they believe the value 
of their stock will rise. In contrast, they will more likely choose to sell stock if they believe the stock will likely 
decline in value. If the tax-related selling is occurring based on material non-public information it would bias 
against our hypothesis that nondiscretionary sales have no information value.  
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We further classify as Discretionary Footnote insider sales executed under 10b5-1 plans. 
In 10b5-1 trades insiders enter into a trading plan, often over multiple years, that pre-plans 
trades for specific dates in the future at a time when the insider possesses no material non-
public information. Rule 10b5-1 trades fall under the safe harbour provisions of the SEC and 
provide the insider with a legal defence against potential penalties. However, despite the fact 
that these trades are pre-planned the insider still possesses considerable discretion about the 
timing and execution of the trades (Jagolinzer 2009). 12 
In separate analyses, we also include trades that are not accompanied by any 
supplementary disclosures in footnotes to the discretionary category calling the comprehensive 
discretionary category Discretionary Trade. We expect investors to view these trades as 
discretionary due to a lack of contrary evidence in the footnotes. We provide examples for each 
footnote disclosure assigned to our classification in the appendix.  
Classifying insider sales according to the supplementary information disclosed in 
footnotes on the Form 4 (or lack thereof) allows us to distinguish the nature of these sales and 
thus their information content using information that is available to investors at the time of the 
insider trade filing. 
  
3. Data and Sample Selection  
3.1. Sample 
We obtain all Form 4s filed electronically with the SEC on EDGAR from 2003 to 2011.13 Table 
1 provides an overview of the sample selection process. We are able to identify 2,087,830 
                                                          
12 Although these plans usually transfer trade execution to an uninformed party such as a broker who trades on 
behalf of the insider based on a pre-specified rule, insiders still retain discretion over the trades in so far as they 
can cancel the trades at any time before the execution date. Jagolinzer (2009), for example, finds that 10b5-1 
sales tend to follow periods of stock price increases and tend to be followed by periods of stock price declines 
suggesting that they do not entirely reflect uninformed trading.  
13 Our sample begins in June 2003 when the SEC first mandated electronic filings of Form 4. We thank Andy 
Leone for making his Perl code for SEC filings downloads publicly available.  
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individual open market sales and purchases of common stock (non-derivative transactions with 
code S and P on SEC Form 4) by 6,970 firms that refer to sales or purchases of more than 100 
shares and less than 20% of shares outstanding. As an insider may record multiple transactions 
on one Form 4 and multiple insiders can trade on the same day, we collapse the transaction-
level sample at the firm-day level. That is, we aggregate all trades in firm i on day t and 
calculate the firm’s daily net trading position (sales minus purchases). Consequently, our initial 
firm-day-level dataset contains 388,521 observations.  
We then match firm observations with data from CRSP, Compustat, and IBES. We follow 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and remove observations for which the share price reported on the 
Form 4 deviates from the closing share price on CRSP by more than 20% and further remove 
firms with a stock price at the beginning of the year of less than $2. Our sample on the firm-
day level comprises 265,161 insider trading days of 6,372 firms. For our main analyses we 
further drop transaction-days that are net purchases of common stock, that are not trades by or 
on behalf of directors or executives, or that contain missing values in any of the transaction 
data on the Form 4. This leaves us with 184,742 transaction-days. In separate analyses, we 
further remove observations that cannot unambiguously be identified as discretionary or non-
discretionary trades according to our classification scheme and restrict the sample to non-
overlapping trades of one or the other category. The restricted sample of firm officer and 
director net sales transactions comprises 141,968 transaction-days of 4,196 firms and 35,391 
insiders. 
3.2. Parsing Form 4 Footnotes 
We use a Python script to parse each Form 4 and collect identifying information and 
transaction details such as name and position of the insider, name and ticker of the company, 
number of shares traded, and share price at sale. We then identify whether the Form contains a 
footnote.  
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We electronically parse the words in the footnotes and summarize them under keywords 
according to their frequency of occurrence. We then manually inspect the list of keywords and, 
based on the keyword frequencies, assign each insider sale filing into one of the following 
groups: contains no footnote, 10b5-1 footnote, gift, discretionary liquidity needs such as 
divorce or children’s tuition, retirement plan, trade on behalf of family, option exercise, tax 
settlement, error correction, and automatic trade. The appendix provides examples for each 
footnote disclosure on the Form 4 assigned to our classification.  
Based on the footnote groups and following our classification rationale discussed in 
Section 2 we create an indicator variable, Nondiscretionary Footnote, that is equal to one if the 
insider sale falls into either one of the categories tax settlement, error correction or automatic 
trade. We create an indicator variable, Discretionary Footnote, that is equal to one if the 
footnote mentions that the sale occurred as a gift, for discretionary liquidity reasons, as part of 
a retirement plan, on behalf of family members and as part of option exercises, and zero 
otherwise.14 We further create another indicator variable, Discretionary Trade, that combines 
trades that do not contain any footnote disclosure with trades that contain Discretionary 
Footnotes. These indicator variables are our main variables of interest. 
3.3. Trade Statistics 
Table 2 Panel A shows the number of observations, number of firms, and number of 
insiders per insider trade category. The majority of insider sales in our sample does not contain 
any footnote disclosures and about a little more than a third relate to 10b5-1 trades. We further 
have about 8,500 footnotes (by 1,400 firms and 4,600 insiders) that contain a discretionary 
reason for the sale and about 1,500 footnotes (by 380 firms and 1,300 insiders) that can be 
classified as nondiscretionary. Panel B shows the average trade size per trade category as a 
                                                          
14 In the restricted sample we exclude trades from these two classifications if the same form includes footnotes 
that refer to both discretionary and nondiscretionary trading reasons or if the footnote description does not allow 
classification into any of the above categories (e.g., if the footnote refers to information not related to the sale).  
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fraction of common shares outstanding and Panel C shows the average trade size in U.S. 
Dollars. Panel B reveals that the average net sale transaction amounts to about 0.085 percent 
of common shares outstanding. Net sales for discretionary reasons involve the largest trade size 
of about 0.35 percent. Sales for nondiscretionary reasons are significantly smaller in size at 
about 0.042 percent of common shares outstanding on average. 
Panel C shows that insiders, on average, sell shares worth $1.4 million, but that net 
insider sales for discretionary reasons (excluding 10b5-1 trades) are significantly larger netting, 
on average, $6.7 million. All other insider sales are significantly smaller at between $1-1.2 
million. Panel C also shows that insider purchases are, on average, much smaller than insider 
sales. We show results of two-sided tests of differences in mean size (in % of common shares 
outstanding) between the four insider sale categories in Table 2, Panel D. The univariate tests 
confirm that discretionary sales (excluding 10b5-1 trades) are significantly larger than all other 
sales and that nondiscretionary sales are significantly smaller than all other sales.15 These 
preliminary results suggest that the motivations for discretionary trades might be very different 
compared to the motivations for nondiscretionary trades. To isolate the information signal of 
the disclosed content in the footnotes from the information content of the trade size all 
subsequent regressions control for trade size. We now turn to our main analyses.  
    
4. Information Content of Form 4 Footnotes  
4.1. Baseline results 
We begin by estimating cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) during the (0,2)-window 
around the Form 4 filing date in a standard event study using a size-adjusted market benchmark 
                                                          
15 We further investigate the cross-sectional differences in trade size in multivariate regressions that include 
control variables as well as firm and year fixed effects. Untabulated regression results confirm the results of the 
univariate tests. Insider sales with discretionary footnotes (excluding 10b5-1 trades) are 61% larger in dollar 
value than insider sales without footnotes (p-value < 0.01). Coefficient tests further reveal that these sales are 
also significantly larger than all other trade types. In contrast, insider sales with nondiscretionary footnotes are, 
on average, 70% smaller in dollar value than insider sales without footnotes. 
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to assess the information content of footnote disclosures. We estimate mean CARs for the entire 
sample, conditional on footnote disclosures, and by footnote classification. Table 3 reports the 
results of univariate means and differences in means. Panel A in Table 3 reveals that, on 
average, net insider transactions elicit a significantly negative market response around the filing 
date of the Form 4. The mean CAR for the total sample is −0.13% (p-value <0.01). Insider 
sales that contain no footnote in the Form 4 have a negative CAR of −0.15% (p-value <0.01), 
while insider sales with a footnote experience a CAR of −0.11% (p-value <0.01). Insider sales 
with discretionary footnotes (excluding 10b5-1 footnotes) experience the largest negative 
market reaction of −0.17%, while abnormal returns to 10b5-1 footnotes are also significantly 
negative at −0.10%. The CARs for insider sales with nondiscretionary footnotes are not 
different from zero (p-value = 0.95).   
Table 3, Panel B reports differences in means between the footnote categories. The 
difference in means between insider sales with disclosure of a footnote and sales without is 
statistically significant (p-value <0.05). The difference is larger between sales with a 10b5-1 
footnote and sales without a footnote (p-value <0.05) and smaller between other discretionary 
footnotes and no footnotes, but not statistically significant. The difference in mean CARs of 
sales with nondiscretionary footnotes and those without any footnote is significantly larger at 
0.15% (p-value <0.1). The difference in mean CARs of other discretionary footnotes and 
nondiscretionary footnotes is significantly negative at −0.17% (p-value <0.1). 
We next estimate equations (1a) and (1b) to assess the market reaction to footnote 
disclosures in a multivariate setting controlling for cross-sectional differences in firm and trade 
characteristics.  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑁 𝑖,𝑡 
+ 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1a) 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 (𝑜𝑟 𝐹𝑁)𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1b) 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the three-day (0,2) cumulative abnormal event-study return starting from the 
insider trade filing day using the size-adjusted market return as the benchmark.16 In equation 
(1a) we allow the classification of insider trades into discretionary and nondiscretionary to 
overlap using two separate indicators equal to 1 representing each category (with trades without 
footnote disclosures or footnotes that cannot be classified into either category being zero) as a 
trade by a given firm might contain both types of footnotes. In equation (1b) we exclude all 
trades that contain both a discretionary and nondiscretionary footnote at the same time. We 
then classify with an indicator variable Discretionary Trade those insider sales that do not 
disclose a footnote or that contain a Discretionary Footnote. We also separately examine 
Discretionary versus Nondiscretionary Footnotes (disregarding trades that do not disclose a 
footnote). 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  is a vector of control variables, 𝛾𝑖 and 𝛿𝑡  are firm and year fixed effects, 
respectively. In additional tests we separately control for manager and firm-manager fixed 
effects.  
We run pooled regressions with standard errors clustered at the firm-level. The goal is to 
examine whether investors find footnote disclosures in Form 4 filings informative and, in 
particular, if they distinguish between discretionary trades/footnotes and nondiscretionary 
footnotes. If outside investors interpret insider sales without a footnote or with a discretionary 
footnote as a signal for an information-based rather than a liquidity-based sale, i.e., as a 
negative signal, we expect  𝛽1 to be negative or insignificantly different from zero and  𝛽2 to 
be positive (as the omitted category in these tests are trades without a footnote) in equation (1a) 
                                                          
16 Our inferences remain the same if we use the two-day window CAR(0,1). We do not include the day prior to 
the filing day to avoid capturing the price impact of the sale in cases in which the Form 4 is filed within 24 
hours of the trade. 
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and in equation (1b) 𝛽1 to be negative (as the omitted category in these tests are trades with 
nondiscretionary footnotes). 
We control for variables identified in the prior literature to be associated with insider 
trading and for commonly known determinants of stock returns. Insiders of large firms and 
firms that have performed well (Lakonishok and Lee 2001) and insiders of growth firms 
(Rozeff and Zaman 1998) tend to sell more shares. We control for firm size (measured as the 
natural logarithm of market value), prior month return (measured as the raw return in the month 
prior to the insider filing), and for growth firms (measured as the natural logarithm of the book-
to-market ratio) (Fama and French 1993, Cohen et al. 2012). In addition, we control for 
leverage (measured as the debt-to-asset ratio), trade size (measured as number of shares sold 
divided by number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the fiscal year), whether the trade 
was the result of a direct ownership by the insider, and whether the trade is made by the CEO 
or CFO (or on behalf of them) (Seyhun 1986, 1998). 
Table 4 presents the regression results of estimations of equation (1a) in columns (1) and 
of estimations of equation (1b) in columns (2)-(3). The results in column (1) reveal that insider 
sales with a discretionary footnote experience negative, but not significantly different abnormal 
returns compared to sales without footnote disclosures. Abnormal returns are 30 basis points 
lower for these two types of insider sales than for those with a nondiscretionary footnote. This 
suggests that discretionary footnote sales are interpreted as information-based sales by 
investors similar to sales that are not accompanied by any disclosure. We therefore combine 
the two into one indicator Discretionary Trade in column (2). 
The results in column (2) confirm that investors find discretionary insider sales (those 
that contain no footnote disclosure and discretionary footnote disclosures) informative and 
interpret these as negative news. Or alternatively stated, investors interpret insider sales with 
nondiscretionary footnote disclosures as less likely to be information-based sales in that they 
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react less negatively to the information that insiders have sold shares. The coefficient on 
Discretionary Trade is −0.32 with a standard error of 0.13 (p-value <0.05), respectively. Over 
the three-day filing window Discretionary Trades earn abnormal returns that are 32 basis points 
lower than trades that we classified as nondiscretionary.  
The coefficient is higher in magnitude if we condition on footnote disclosure. Column 
(3) shows that the coefficient on Discretionary Footnote is also significantly negative at −0.36 
(p-value <0.05). That is, investors react to insider sales that contain a discretionary footnote 
significantly more negatively by 36 basis points in cumulative abnormal returns over three days 
than to insider sales that contain a nondiscretionary footnote. This difference is economically 
large. Column (2) and (3) further reveal that sales of insiders of larger firms, growth firms, and 
firms with high leverage also have lower CARs. Additionally, there is some evidence that sales 
by the CEO and CFO earn more negative CARs. 
The estimations in columns (4) and (5) further control for manager and manager-firm 
fixed effects, respectively, with standard errors clustered at the manager or manager-firm level. 
The latter allows us to hold manager-firm pairings fixed and assess whether the effect can be 
explained by manager characteristics. The results in column (4) reveal that the market reaction 
to discretionary insider sales is significantly more negative than to nondiscretionary sales by 
the same manager by about 44 basis points (p-value <0.01) and column (5) shows that this 
difference is larger at 48 basis points within manager-firm pairings (p-value <0.01).17 The 
results suggest that the market interprets discretionary insider sales as containing negative 
information  about the future prospects of the firm and that this cannot be explained by manager 
types.18  
                                                          
17 As different managers might trade on the same day our sample observations increase slightly in the tests with 
manager and manager-firm fixed effects taking into account multiple trades per firm (by different managers) on 
the same day.  
18 In additional analyses we further control for 10b5-1 trades separately instead of including them in our 
Discretionary Footnote category. Untabulated findings reveal that our results are not driven by the inclusion of 
10b5-1 trades. 
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4.2. Are trades by CEOs and CFOs more informative? 
The evidence in several studies implicitly suggests that trades by CEOs and CFOs are 
the most informative among insider trades as these executives most likely have the greatest 
information advantage (Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser 2003; Wang, Shin and Francis 2012). 
We therefore estimate equations (1a) and (1b) also separately for these two groups of executive 
insiders to provide direct evidence on this conjecture. 
If the CEO and CFO have the greatest information advantage we expect to find a larger 
negative market reaction to discretionary sales by CEOs and CFOs. Table 4 columns (6) to (10) 
summarize the results. The regression results in column (6) confirm a more negative and 
statistically significant coefficient on both Discretionary Footnote and Nondiscretionary 
Footnote in the specification where we allow for overlap. The coefficient on Discretionary 
Footnote is −0.15% (p-value <0.1) and the coefficient on Nondiscretionary Footnote is 0.66% 
(p-value <0.01). That is, abnormal returns on trades by CEOs or CFOs are significantly higher 
by around 80 basis points for sales that contain a nondiscretionary footnote compared to those 
with discretionary footnotes.   
Further disentangling the results, Table 4 columns (7) and (8) report coefficients on 
Discretionary Trade and Discretionary Footnote for the CEO/CFO subsample at −0.95% and 
−1.31% (p-values <0.01), respectively. CEO and CFO insider sales accompanied by a 
discretionary footnote earn an economically large −1.31% cumulative abnormal return over the 
three-day filing window. That is, there is a more than 95 basis point relative difference in the 
negative reaction to discretionary sales compared to nondiscretionary sales if the insiders are 
the CEO or the CFO of the company. The results in column (9) and (10) again confirm that our 
findings are robust to controlling for manager characteristics and estimations within manager-
firm pairings. 
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Overall, our results on short-term returns demonstrate that there is significant information 
value in discretionary insider sales (whether defined as Discretionary Trade or as 
Discretionary Footnote), particularly if the sales are made by the CEO or CFO of the company. 
This stands in contrast to much of the prior literature that fails to find insider sales to have any 
information content (Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser, 
2003).  
4.3. Do Perceived Differences in Internal Controls Matter? 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 not only requires more timely disclosures of 
insider trade filings (Section 403 of SOX), but also includes other far-reaching corporate 
governance and reporting requirements for U.S. publicly listed companies. Among these, 
Section 302 mandates internal controls and procedures for accurate disclosure and Section 
404(b) requires the company’s management and auditors to report on the effectiveness of 
internal controls. Section 404(b) was highly contentious due to its perceived high compliance 
burden particularly on small companies. This led to a temporary exemption for companies with 
a market capitalization of less than $75 million, so-called nonaccelerated filers, which was 
subsequently made permanent in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010. At the same time, it was initially discussed to also alleviate the compliance burden 
for companies with a market capitalization of $75-$250 million, which culminated in a study 
published by the SEC in 2011.19 The exemption from SOX Section 404(b) was later expanded 
to and introduced for companies with a market cap of $75-$700 million.20 
The exemption of selected SOX requirements for small companies during our sample 
period potentially led investors to perceive these companies as being afforded laxer disclosure 
                                                          
19 See SEC, Study and Recommendations on Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 For Issuers 
With Public Float Between $75 and $250 Million, April 2011, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/404bfloat-study.pdf (last accessed 30 March 2018). 
20 See SEC final rule 17 CFR Parts 201, 229 and 249 available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/33-
9142.pdf (last accessed 30 March 2018). 
  
23 
 
and internal control requirements. We therefore test whether the differential market reaction to 
trades with discretionary footnotes compared to nondiscretionary footnotes is more pronounced 
for firms with less than $75 million and $75-$250million in market capitalization. Table 5 
summarizes the results for the full sample and for trades by CEOs and CFOs only.  
The results in Table 5 show that the difference in CARs between discretionary and 
nondiscretionary trades monotonically increases with a decreasing size threshold. For example, 
the difference in CARs is 2.1% (p-value <0.05) for firms with a market cap smaller than $75 
million compared to 0.7% (p-value <0.1) for firms in the size bracket $75-250 million and 
0.22% (p-value <0.05) for firms with a market cap larger than $250 million. These differences 
are even higher for trades by CEOs and CFOs at 6.5% (p-value <0.01), 1.91% (p-value <0.05) 
and 0.46% (p-value <0.01), respectively. These findings suggest that investors consider 
discretionary trades more likely to be informative if internal controls and disclosure 
requirements (and potentially their enforcement) are perceived to be weaker.  
          
5. Long-Term Returns 
5.1. Baseline results 
We next estimate the association of insider trade disclosure with long-term returns 
measured over one month, three months, and 12 months. If insider sales that contain 
discretionary footnote disclosures are informative of future negative performance of the firm 
and if investors do not fully impound that information immediately into short-term prices 
around the filing date, we expect a negative association of insider trade disclosure with long-
term returns. Equations (2), the long-term equivalent of equation (1a), summarizes the 
estimating equation of long-term returns on our discretionary and nondiscretionary insider sale 
categories controlling for cross-sectional differences in firm and trade characteristics: 
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𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 (𝑜𝑟 𝐹𝑁)𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽2𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 (𝑜𝑟 𝐹𝑁) 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
where 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 is the one month buy-and-hold abnormal return in the calendar month after 
the insider trade using the size-adjusted market return as benchmark or the three months and 
twelve months buy-and-hold abnormal return starting from the calendar month after the month 
of the insider trade. Returns are measured monthly. As in equation (1a) we allow both 
Discretionary Trade (Footnote) and Nondiscretionary Trade (Footnote) to enter the regression 
simultaneously. In this specification, Discretionary Trade (Footnote) is equal to one if there 
has been at least one discretionary trade (footnote) and Nondiscretionary Trade (Footnote) is 
equal to one if there has been at least one nondiscretionary trade (footnote) during the calendar 
month.  
As an alternative specification at the monthly level, we calculate our variables of interest 
as the natural logarithm of one plus the net number of discretionary trades in month t and one 
plus the net number of insider sales with discretionary footnotes, respectively. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a vector 
of control variables, 𝛾𝑖 and 𝛿𝑡 are firm and month fixed effects, respectively. In addition to the 
control variables used in equation (1) we also include the prior year buy-and-hold returns. 
Table 6 summarizes the regression results. Panel A shows results using the indicator 
variables allowing for overlap and Panel B shows the results using the net count variables. 
Panel A reveals monotonically decreasing coefficients on the Discretionary Trade and 
Discretionary Footnote indicators and monotonically increasing coefficients on the 
Nondiscretionary Trade and Nondiscretionary Footnote indicators the longer the holding 
period of measurement for the buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The coefficient on 
Discretionary Trade in the regression of one month buy-and-hold abnormal returns is 
significantly negative at −0.22% (p-value <0.05), decreasing to −0.43% (p-value <0.1) over 
three months, and to −2.14% (p-value <0.01) over 12 months. In contrast, the coefficient on 
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Nondiscretionary Trade in the regression of one month buy-and-hold abnormal returns is 
significantly positive at 1.13% (p-value <0.01), increasing to 1.74% over three months (p-value 
<0.05), and to 1.93% over 12 months (the latter albeit statistically insignificant). The one-
month abnormal return differential between Discretionary and Nondiscretionary Trade results 
in an economically significant 17.5% annualised return difference. A similar pattern emerges 
when limiting the analysis to Discretionary and Nondiscretionary Footnote. Insider sales with 
discretionary footnote disclosures are associated with significantly lower returns compared 
with insider sales that are accompanied with nondiscretionary footnote disclosures. 
Table 6 Panel B shows results using the net count variables instead. The results are 
similar to those in Panel A. The coefficient on Net Discretionary Trade Count over one month 
is −0.73% (p-value <0.01), decreasing to −1.4% (p-value <0.01) over three months, and further 
decreasing to −2.56% (p-value <0.01) over 12 months. The results suggest that discretionary 
insider sales are associated with 2.56% lower future returns than nondiscretionary insider 
sales.21 Overall, the results in this section demonstrate that discretionary insider sales are 
associated with significantly negative abnormal long-term returns. Together with the results on 
short-term filing returns in the previous section, the results suggest that although investors 
interpret the disclosure of discretionary footnotes or the absence of any footnote as bad news, 
they fail to fully impound the negative information immediately into stock prices leading to a 
long-term underperformance of these firms. We next examine whether sophisticated investors 
could potentially exploit the market’s under-reaction to discretionary insider sales in a long-
short trading strategy. 
  
                                                          
21 The coefficients of Net Discretionary Footnote Count display a similar monotonic pattern declining from a 
significantly negative −0.72% (p-value <0.01) when regressed on one-month abnormal returns, to −1.61% (p-
value <0.01) in the regression on 3 months buy-and-hold abnormal returns, to −2.27% (p-value <0.01) in the 
regression on 12-months buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
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5.2. Portfolio Returns 
Table 6 Panel C presents results of calendar-time portfolio regressions. In each month the 
investment strategy creates an equally-weighted long portfolio of stocks with nondiscretionary 
insider sales and a short portfolio of stocks with discretionary insider sales. It then holds the 
portfolios over the next month following the insider trades and rebalances at the end of the 
month based on the new insider trades of that month. The panel shows average returns as well 
as excess returns of the Fama-French three-factor model and of the Cahart-four-factor model 
for the full sample and only using trades by CEOs and CFOs. The results show that going long 
a portfolio of nondiscretionary insider sales and short a portfolio of discretionary insider sales 
earns an average return of 0.86 (p-value <0.05), or 1.25% (p-value <0.05) focusing on 
CEO/CFO trades, per month before transaction costs. After controlling for Fama-French and 
Cahart factors, the strategy earns monthly excess returns of 0.78% (p-value <0.05) and 0.81% 
(p-value <0.05), respectively, that increase to 1.15% and 1.23% if the strategy only uses trades 
by CEOs and CFOs. This translates into an economically meaningful 16% risk-adjusted return 
per year. The portfolio results provide further evidence of the predictive ability of our 
classification into discretionary and nondiscretionary insider sales. 
5.3. Repeated Discretionary Trades 
In this section we examine whether firms whose executives engage in relatively more 
discretionary insider sales compared to nondiscretionary sales perform worse. That is, we ask 
the question whether there are executives that more often claim to trade for liquidity and other 
discretionary reasons than others and whether this trading and disclosure behaviour further 
contains information. To investigate this question, we cross-sectionally divide the sample into 
quartiles based on each executive’s frequency of discretionary sales to total insider sales and 
re-run our BHAR regression tests over the 1-month holding period. Table 7 reports the results 
for executives with less than 25% discretionary sales (column 1), between 25-75% 
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discretionary sales (column 2) and more than 75% discretionary sales (column 3). The 
regressions use the same Discretionary Trade (Footnote) and Nondiscretionary Trade 
(Footnote) indicators and controls as in the baseline regressions.  
The results reveal that the return differential between discretionary and nondiscretionary 
sales increases monotonically with the increasing frequency of discretionary insider sales of an 
executive. For example, the coefficient on Discretionary Footnote in column (1) is −0.002 (p-
value <0.05) decreasing to −0.016 (p-value <0.01) in column (3), while the coefficient on 
Nondiscretionary Footnote is not statistically different from zero in column (1) and increases 
to 0.147 (p-value <0.01) in column (3).  
The findings in this section suggest that insider sales of executives that more frequently 
trade for discretionary reasons are more likely to predict negative stock returns. We next 
examine whether discretionary insider sales predict fundamental negative information as the 
underlying source of the negative long-term stock return performance. 
 
6. What Bad News Do Discretionary Insider Sales Predict? 
In this section we analyse whether discretionary insider sales are predictive of future negative 
fundamental news. That is, we examine whether insiders that sell shares and disclose a 
discretionary footnote or do not disclose any footnote are more likely than other insiders that 
sell shares to trade preceding important negative information events of the firm. We define as 
negative information events future analyst recommendation downgrades, negative earnings 
surprises, and announcements of class action lawsuits against the company. 
6.1. Analyst Recommendation Downgrades 
We start by examining the association of discretionary insider sales with future analyst 
recommendation downgrades. Table 8, Panel A presents results of tobit regressions on a 
continuous variable, Weighted Downgrade, bounded between zero and four. Weighted 
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Downgrade is measured as an indicator variable that is equal to one if analyst consensus 
recommendations in the 6, 12, and 18 months prior to the month of the insider sale filing were 
higher than in the same period after the filing month, weighted by the magnitude of the 
downgrade. That is, the dependent variable captures whether the insider sale preceded a general 
lowering of recommendations for the firm by analysts and by how much.22 For example, a 
downgrade by one notch from hold to sell is weighted by one, whereas a downgrade from buy 
to sell by two notches is weighted by two. The maximum weight is four, which reflects a 
downgrade from Strong Buy to Strong Sell.  
 As before, we show results using the indicator variables Discretionary and 
Nondiscretionary Footnote as well as Net Discretionary Footnote Count, the latter of which is 
measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the net number of insider sales with discretionary 
footnotes in month t. The regressions include the same control variables as before as well as 
month fixed effects. If Discretionary Footnote and Net Discretionary Footnote Count are 
associated with a higher propensity of analysts downgrading the company, we expect the 
coefficient on the two variables to be significantly positive.  
The results in Table 8, Panel A confirm our expectations. The coefficients of 
Discretionary Footnote are positive and increasing with the length of the measurement period 
from 0.025 (p-value <0.05) at six months to 0.022 (p-value <0.05) at 12 months, and 0.030 (p-
value <0.01) at 18 months. The results demonstrate that Discretionary Footnote is positively 
associated with a downgrade of larger magnitude than insider sales with Nondiscretionary 
Footnotes. For example, over the 18 months horizon, a one unit increase in the log number of 
discretionary trades in a month is associated with a 3% higher average downgrade magnitude. 
We do not find such an increase in the downgrade likelihood and severity for sales with 
                                                          
22 We find similar results using an unweighted indicator for a consensus downgrade as the dependent variable. 
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nondiscretionary footnotes. If anything, the coefficients on Nondiscretionary Footnote are 
negative, albeit statistically insignificant.23 
The results are similar when using Net Discretionary Footnote Count. For the 6, 12, and 
18 months horizon, the coefficients are 0.028 (p-value <0.05), 0.039 (p-value <0.01), and 0.034 
(p-value <0.01), respectively. For example, over the 18 months horizon, a one unit increase in 
the log number of insider sales with discretionary footnotes in a month is associated with a 
3.4% higher average downgrade magnitude. 
Overall, the results suggest that months during which insiders more often sell shares 
accompanied by a discretionary footnote are predictive of a higher propensity of analyst 
downgrades in the following 6 to 18 months and predictive of downgrades of larger magnitude.  
6.2. Negative Earnings Surprises 
 To further establish whether discretionary insider sales are informative for upcoming 
bad news about the firm, we next examine the relationship of discretionary insider sales and 
the propensity and magnitude of earnings misses on the next fiscal year end earnings 
announcement and on the four quarters ahead quarterly earnings announcement. To do so, we 
again run tobit regressions on a weighted indicator, Earnings Miss, equal to one if the company 
fails to meet or beat its analyst earnings per share consensus forecast for the closest fiscal year 
end (irrespective of whether the fiscal year end is one or four quarters away from the month of 
the insider trade) and for the fiscal quarter four quarters ahead (i.e., keeping the distance 
between the insider trade-month and the earnings announcement always at four quarters), 
weighted by the magnitude of the negative earnings surprise.  
As in the previous subsection, we run the regressions using the indicator variables 
Discretionary and Nondiscretionary Footnote as well as Net Discretionary Footnote Count. 
                                                          
23 Untabulated results using unweighted indicators suggest that discretionary insider sales are associated with a 
3.4% increase in the analyst consensus downgrade likelihood over the coming 18 months. 
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The regressions include the same control variables as before as well as month fixed effects, 
except when using Earnings Miss at fiscal year-end, in which case we additionally control for 
the time between the insider trade and the next fiscal year end. If Discretionary Footnote and 
Net Discretionary Footnote Count are associated with a higher propensity of earnings misses 
and larger negative earnings surprises we expect the coefficient of the two variables to be 
significantly positive. 
Table 8 Panel B presents the results. Column (1) in Panel B shows that we do not find 
statistically significant coefficients when using both indicators simultaneously, i.e., allowing 
for a trade-month to be classified as having trades with discretionary as well as 
nondiscretionary footnotes, although the coefficient on Nondiscretionary Footnote has the 
expected negative sign. However, we find some weak evidence of a positive association of 
discretionary insider sales with the likelihood of negative earnings surprises of higher 
magnitude in the future. The coefficient on Net Discretionary Footnote Count is positive and 
statistically significant in the regressions on the next fiscal year end (0.10, p-value <0.1) and 
four quarters ahead earnings announcement (0.16, p-value <0.05). The latter suggests a one 
unit increase in the log number of discretionary footnotes in a month increases the magnitude 
of a negative earnings surprise of a company at the quarterly earnings announcement four 
quarters ahead by 16%.24 
The results in this section suggest that months during which insiders more often sell 
shares accompanied by a discretionary footnote are predictive of a higher propensity of 
negative earnings surprises at the next quarterly earnings announcement as well as predictive 
of negative earnings surprises of larger magnitude. We acknowledge, however, that the 
evidence in this subset of the results is somewhat weak. Nevertheless, taken together with the 
                                                          
24 We find similar results when using an unweighted indicator as the dependent variable. For example, 
untabulated results reveal that a one unit increase in the log net number of discretionary footnotes in a month 
increases the propensity of a company missing its earnings consensus forecast for the fiscal year by 11.1% and 
for four quarters ahead by 2.1%. 
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results of the previous section, the findings suggest that discretionary insider sales precede 
future negative earnings news. 
6.3. Future Litigation 
While the previous tests focus on financial bad news such as recommendation downgrades and 
negative earnings surprises, in the last test of this section we investigate the association of 
discretionary insider sales with another proxy for bad news not directly related to financial 
metrics: class action lawsuits. Specifically, we examine the association of discretionary insider 
sales with the propensity of lawsuit initiations within the subsequent two years of an insider 
trade. We do not investigate the reasons for the lawsuits but consider the mere fact that a suit 
is brought against the company as a proxy for some underlying governance issues, business 
problems, or other negative news generally to the detriment of shareholders. If insiders possess 
inside information of potential pending litigation initiations that might have negative 
consequences for shareholder value, they might attempt to sell well ahead of revelation of the 
news. 
For this analysis we match litigation cases from the Stanford Law School Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse with our sample of insider trade months. We define an indicator variable 
litigation equal to one if a lawsuit is filed against the company within one month of the insider 
sale and up to 24 months after. If discretionary insider sales are associated with a higher 
propensity of future litigation we expect the coefficients on our variables of interest 
Discretionary Trade and Discretionary Footnote to be significantly positive. The regressions 
include the same control variables as before as well as month fixed effects. We further repeat 
the analysis with our net count variables Net Discretionary Trade/Footnote Count. 
Table 9 presents the results. The results in Column (1) reveal that the coefficient on 
Discretionary Trade is significantly positive (0.006, p-value <0.01), while the coefficient on 
Nondiscretionary Trade is significantly negative (−0.014, p-value <0.05). The difference in 
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coefficients is a significant 0.02. That is, discretionary insider sales experience a 2% increase 
in the propensity of litigation initiations subsequent to the insider trade compared to 
nondiscretionary insider sales. This increase is economically large compared to the 
unconditional litigation likelihood of 1.51% in our sample.  
The results in Column (2) are similar when limiting the analysis to discretionary 
footnotes. The coefficient on Discretionary Footnote is significantly positive (0.005, p-value 
<0.01), while the coefficient on Nondiscretionary Footnote is significantly negative (-0.015, 
p-value <0.01). Column (3) presents the results when using the net count of discretionary 
footnotes in a given month. The coefficients on Net Discretionary Trade/Footnote Count are 
also significantly positive (0.004, p-values <0.05 and 0.1, respectively). The results are 
consistent with the findings in the previous sub-section that discretionary insider sales precede 
future bad news. 
 
7. Robustness tests 
Prior attempts in the literature to distinguish information-based insider trades from 
uninformative liquidity-based trades use insiders’ trading patterns as an identifying criterion.   
Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012), for example, identify information-based insider trades by 
classifying insiders into routine and opportunistic traders according to the timing of their 
trading each year compared to their past trading record. Insiders that execute their trades in the 
same calendar month every year for three years are classified as routine and their trades are 
predicted to be uninformative. Those that show no discernible pattern are classified as 
opportunistic. Cohen et al. (2012) show that opportunistic sales are associated with 
significantly negative returns one month ahead.  
As a robustness test we therefore assess to what extent insider sales that we identify as 
discretionary overlap with opportunistic sales as defined by Cohen et al (2012). Table 10, Panel 
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A shows that we identify 23,454 insider trade months in our sample as discretionary that are 
not classified as opportunistic using Cohen et al.’s (2012) classification, whereas our 
classification fails to classify 303 insider trade months as discretionary that we identify as 
opportunistic according to Cohen et al. (2012). In other words, for our sample we are able to 
identify an additional set of insider trades as informative using the insiders’ own disclosures 
that we would have missed by simply using their past trading behaviour.  
In addition, we test whether our results on long-run returns are robust to the inclusion of 
a classifier that identifies opportunistic sales based on the insider’s prior trading behaviour. If 
footnote disclosures in the Form 4 are incrementally informative for future negative stock 
returns our results should remain robust and have incremental explanatory power to the 
inclusion of an indicator variable that follows Cohen et al.’s (2012) classification into 
opportunistic trades. 
Table 10, Panel B summarizes the results. Panel B shows the results of the regressions 
on buy-and-hold abnormal returns over one, three, and 12 months using our indicator variables 
Discretionary Trade and Discretionary Footnote. The table replicates our regressions on long-
term abnormal buy-and-hold returns presented in Table 6 and includes an additional indicator 
variable Opportunistic Trade (Count) defined as in Cohen et al. (2012) as all trades of the same 
firm that have no obvious discernible pattern in relation to the previous three years.25 
Table 10 Panel B shows that the coefficient on Opportunistic Trade loads negatively and 
is statistically significant, consistent with Cohen et al. (2012). However, our Discretionary 
Trade and Discretionary Footnote indicators retain their explanatory power for future negative 
stock returns and their monotonically increasing relationship with holding period length. 
Importantly, the coefficients on Discretionary Trade and Discretionary Footnote are 
                                                          
25 A key difference between our implementation and Cohen et al. (2012) is that we aggregate our trade data on 
the firm-month level and include firm fixed effects in addition to month fixed effects. We also create a net count 
variable of net opportunistic sells for comparison with our net count variables in Table 10, Panel B. 
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significantly larger in magnitude than Opportunistic Trade. Over the 12-months period the 
coefficient on Discretionary Trade is −4.21% (p-value <0.05) compared to the coefficient on 
Opportunistic Trade, that is −1.81% (p-value <0.05). An F-Test confirms that this difference 
is statistically significant (F = 7.67, p-value <0.01). The results suggest that classifying insider 
sales by footnote disclosures is incrementally informative to investors and significantly more 
potent as a signal of negative future returns than the insider’s previous trading patterns. Overall, 
the robustness test in this section confirms that the insider’s Form 4 footnote disclosures 
contain incremental information value over and above what investors might be able to discern 
from the insider’s past trading patterns. 
 
8. Conclusions 
Our paper is the first to examine the information contained in executives’ supplementary 
disclosures in footnotes on SEC Form 4 that accompany their stock sales. By extracting and 
analysing the textual descriptions about the nature of the insider sale contained in these 
footnotes, we are able to distinguish discretionary from nondiscretionary insider sales. We 
identify as discretionary insider sales those that do not come with footnote disclosures and 
those that, while describing liquidity motivated sales, refer to sales for which the insider has 
considerable discretion over their timing and amount. Classifying insider sales according to the 
supplementary information disclosed in footnotes on the Form 4 (or lack thereof) allows us to 
distinguish the nature of these sales and thus their information content using information that 
is available to investors at the time of the insider trade filing. 
 We find that discretionary insider sales are significantly larger than other insider sales 
and are informative to investors producing significantly lower abnormal returns to the trade 
filing than nondiscretionary sales. We further find the differential market reaction to 
discretionary versus nondiscretionary insider sales to be higher for trades by the CEO and CFO 
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and for firms with perceived weaker internal controls. Our evidence on long-run returns suggest 
that investors under-react to the information in these footnote as we find that discretionary 
insider sales are highly predictive of future negative stock returns. Investigating the sources of 
the stock return underperformance of firms with discretionary insider sales we find these sales 
to be associated with a higher propensity of future analyst downgrades, larger negative earnings 
surprises, and a higher likelihood of future litigation. The results are robust to the inclusion of 
several controls, within manager-firm estimations and show that the insider’s disclosure choice 
is more informative than using the insider’s past trading pattern as signal for distinguishing 
informative from uninformative sales.   
Collectively, our findings suggest that investors are able to identify particular insider 
sales that are informative based on the insider’s footnote disclosures on the trade filing. Even 
though insiders describe liquidity reasons for the sale of stock in these footnotes, these sales in 
fact contain information value. Although investors seem to be able to discern the information 
in footnotes to distinguish between discretionary and nondiscretionary insider sales, they do 
not seem to fully grasp the negative information contained in these trades.  
Our findings are important as they allow investors, regulators, and other market 
participants to assess the information content of insider sales and identify those sales that are 
potentially based on material non-public information directly from information disclosed on 
(or withheld from) insider trade filings. They potentially also suggest that these supplementary 
disclosures on mandatory trade filings should be scrutinized more closely by regulators.  
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Appendix A 
Examples of Form 4 Footnotes Excerpts 
Discretionary Footnotes 
Gift 
 “this transaction involved a gift of securities by the reporting person to a charity that operates on land and 
in a building owned by the reporting person. the charity subsequently sold these securities. the reporting 
person disclaims beneficial ownership of the shares held by the charity, except to the extent of his pecuniary 
interest therein.” (cusip: 69318J10; date: 02 Dec. 2011) 
“on september 18, 2008 mr. dodson gifted 150 shares. this gift of shares will be reported on a form 5 for the 
year ending 2008.” (cusip: 66765510; date: 12 Nov. 2008) 
Liquidity 
“shares sold to diversify investments.” (cusip: 89011010; date: 28 Feb. 2007) 
“reporting person diversifying his portfolio as part of estate planning.” (cusip: G3223R10; date: 29 Oct. 
2008) 
“sale pursuant to distribution of marital assets in divorce settlement.” (cusip: 75991610; date: 22 Feb. 2008) 
Retirement 
“reflects sale of shares held by the johnson outdoors 401(k) retirement and savings plan (the "401(k) plan").  
sale of shares occurred due to the administrative procedures of the 401(k) plan, which would require a portion 
of future administrative sales of class a common stock by the 401(k) plan to be allocated to ms. johnson-
leipold as a result of her holdings in the 401(k) plan.” (cusip: 47916710; date: 16 Dec. 2010) 
“the reporting person indirectly owns 1,120.973 shares under the black & decker retirement plan.” (cusip: 
09179710; date: 12 Nov. 2003) 
“includes 4,950 shares deferred until reporting person's retirement.” (cusip: 65339F10; date: 10 Sept. 2010) 
Family 
“held jointly with spouse.” (cusip: 00103110; date: 31 Jan. 2005) 
“in addition, there are 428,520 shares owned by reporting person's spouse.  the reporting person disclaims 
beneficial ownership of these securities, and this report shall not be deemed an admission that the reporting 
person is the beneficial owner of the securities for purpose of section 16 or for any other purposes.” (cusip: 
59491810; date: 22 Nov. 2004) 
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Appendix A 
(continued) 
Options 
“same day sale of shares exercised pursuant to the canyon resources corporation incentive and non-qualified 
stock option plans.” (cusip: 13886930; date: 19 November 2003) 
“exercised stock options were scheduled to expire on january 31, 2012.” (cusip: 90781810; date: 28 Oct. 
2011) 
10b5 
“sale of shares pursuant to rule 10b5-1 plan adopted on january 31, 2006.” (cusip: 68389X10; date: 20 March 
2006) 
“shares were sold pursuant to a rule 10b5-1 plan.” (cusip: 72913210; date: 04 Jan. 2011) 
 
Nondiscretionary Footnotes 
Tax 
“sale of additional shares to cover personal federal income tax obligation.” (cusip: 94106L10; date: 29 Jan. 
2008) 
“shares sold to cover cost of exercise and taxes” (cusip: 36955010; date: 05 Sept. 2003) 
Error 
“dummy entry as required by software error.” (cusip: 03062T10; date: 30 Sept. 2003) 
“due to an administrative error, adjustment of total shares by 1.933 based upon the dividend reinvestment of 
the september 21 stock dividend payment.” (cusip: 33791510; date: 02 Dec. 2009) 
Automatic 
“vested rsu shares automatically sold by company on behalf of employee in conjunction with company's 
deferred compensation plan.” (cusip: 25454310; date: 29 May 2009) 
“automatic sale pursuant to 1065-1 plan.“ (cusip: 71271430; date: 06 July 2006) 
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APPENDIX B  
Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Definition 
Firm-level    
CAR(0,2) Cumulative Abnormal Return around insider trading filing 
event (in %). Raw returns are winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1% (source: CRSP) 
Abn. Ret(t+1) Abnormal return one month after the insider filing month; 
calculated as raw monthly return minus value weighted 
CRSP-return; raw returns are winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1% (in %) (source: CRSP) 
BHAR(-2,-12) Buy-and-Hold-Abnormal Return from 2 months prior to 
insider filing (t=-2) to 12 months prior to the filing (where 
abnormal returns are based on size portfolios) (in %) (see 
Cohen et al. 2012) (source: CRSP) 
BHAR(t+1;t+3)/ BHAR(t+1;t+12)/... Buy-and-Hold-Abnormal Return from month after insider 
filing (t=1) to three / 12 months after filing in % (where 
abnormal returns are based on size portfolios) (source: 
CRSP) 
Prior Month Return Raw Return in month prior to insider filing (in %) (source: 
CRSP) 
Return(t+1; t+2) / Return(t+1; t+3) Cumulated Raw Return from month after insider filing (t=1) 
to two / three months (t=2)/(t=3) after filing (in %) (source: 
CRSP) 
Debt-to-Assets Quarterly liabilities / quarterly assets (source: Compustat) 
Litigation Indicator equal to one if a class action lawsuit is filed within 
t+1 to t+24 months following an insider sale (source: 
Stanford Securities Class Action Clearning House) 
Book-to-Market Natural logarithm of book-to-market value (source: 
Compustat) 
Size Natural logarithm of market capitalization (source: 
Compustat) 
ROA Return on Assets (source: Compustat) 
Trade-level 
  
CEO/CFO Indicator Indicator equal to one if at least one of the trades on a day 
is made by the CEO or CFO (source: EDGAR) 
Direct Ownership Indicator equal to one if transaction is the result of direct (as 
opposed to indirect) ownership (i.e., executive/director 
directly and not for relatives etc.) (source: EDGAR) 
Discretionary FN vs Nondiscretionary FN Indicator equal to one if insider filing has a discretionary 
footnote and zero if the filing has a nondiscretionary 
footnote (source: EDGAR) 
(Continued on next page) 
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Appendix B 
(continued) 
Variable Name Definition 
Trade-level 
  
Discretionary Footnote Indicator equal to one if insider filing has a discretionary 
footnote and zero if the filing has no footnote  (source: 
EDGAR) 
Discretionary Trade Indicator equal to one if insider filing has no footnote or a 
discretionary footnote, zero otherwise (source: EDGAR) 
Nondiscretionary Trade / Footnote Indicator equal to one if insider filing has a nondiscretionary 
footnote and zero if the filing has no footnote (source: 
EDGAR) 
Net Discretionary Trade Count Natural logarithm of the net number of discretionary trades 
within one month plus one (i.e., ln(net number of 
discretionary trades + 1)) 
Net Discretionary Footnote Count Natural logarithm of the net number of discretionary trades 
within one month plus one (i.e., ln(net number of 
discretionary footnotes + 1)) 
Trade Size Number of shares sold divided by number of shares 
outstanding at the beginning of the fiscal year (in %). At 
monthly level: this variable is the average trade size per 
month (with trade size defined as above) (source: EDGAR) 
Analysts 
  
Downgrade Indicator  
6 / 12 / 18 Months 
Equal to one if analyst consensus recommendations in 
six/12 /18 months prior to the insider filing was higher than 
in the same period after the filing (source: I/B/E/S) 
Downgrade Indicator Weighted  
6 / 12 / 18 Months 
Downgrade Indicator weighted by the severity of the 
downgrade measured by the change in consensus estimates 
(source: I/B/E/S) 
EA Missed Indicator equal to one if firm missed the analyst forecast at 
the closest subsequent earnings announcement date and 
zero otherwise (source: I/B/E/S) 
EA Missed Weighted EA Missed Indicator weighted by the amount of the 
earnings surprise; bounded at lower end by zero (source: 
I/B/E/S) 
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Figure 1 
SEC Form 4 Example 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
  Observations 
 
Firms 
Open market firm-insider transactions (transaction level) 2,236,307 6,980 
- Large trades of > 20% of shares outstanding (599)   
- Small transactions (<100 shares) (147,878)   
= 2,087,830 6,970 
      
After collapsing at firm-day-level 388,521 6,970 
- Observations without CRSP-data available (79,335)   
- Observations without Compustat-data available (10,801)   
- Observations without IBES-data available (33,224)   
= 265,161 6,372 
      
- Missing transaction data (12,720)   
- Non-net sale transactions (55,192)   
- Observations from non-directors and non-officers (12,497)   
= Sample allowing for overlapping classifications 184,742  
- Not unambiguously classified  (42,774)   
= Final Sample 141,968 4,196 
Notes: This table presents the sample selection process starting with all downloaded SEC Form 4 filings 
collapsed to the firm-day-level. The table presents both the total number of observations as well as the 
number of unique firms at each step of the process. 
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Table 2 
 Insider Trade Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Observations by Footnote Category 
    N   # Firms    # Insiders 
Nondiscretionary Footnote   1,515   380   1,318 
Discretionary Footnote (excl. 10b5-1)   8,464   1,418   4,618 
10b5-1 Footnote   51,556   1,890   9,507 
No Footnote   80,433   3,923   28,168 
Total   141,968   4,196   35,391 
Panel B: Average Trade Size in % of Common Shares Outstanding 
    
Sale  
Size 
  
Purchase 
Size 
  
Net Sale 
Size 
Nondiscretionary Footnote   0.042   0.031   0.040 
Discretionary Footnote (excl. 10b5-1)   0.352   0.131   0.349 
10b5-1 Footnote   0.053   0.012   0.053 
No Footnote   0.079   0.039   0.078 
Average  0.085  0.045  0.085 
Panel C: Average Trades Size in US Dollar  
    
Sale  
Size 
  
Purchase 
Size 
  
Net Sale 
Size 
Nondiscretionary Footnote    1,254,403   242,056   1,241,940 
Discretionary Footnote (excl. 10b5-1)    6,712,684   164,366   6,682,238 
10b5-1 Footnote    1,093,091   95,902   1,092,738 
No Footnote    1,002,318   131,992   1,000,438 
Average  1,378,419  283,933  1,375,277 
Panel D: Differences in Average Trade Size (% of Common Shares)     
    
Nondiscretionary 
Footnote 
  
Discretionary 
Footnote 
(excl. 10b5-1) 
  
10b5-1 
Footnote 
Nondiscretionary Footnote             
Discretionary Footnote (excl. 10b5-1)   0.3088***         
10b5-1 Footnote   0.0129**    -0.2959***     
No Footnote   0.0375***    -0.2713***   0.0246*** 
Notes: This table presents sub-sample characteristics and descriptive statistics of the final sample of observations. 
Panel A shows the number of observations by footnote category. Panel B shows the average trade size as % of 
common shares outstanding. Panel C shows the average trade size in U.S. Dollar. Panel D shows the difference in 
average trade size (as % of common shares) between footnote categories (rows minus columns). ***, **, * denotes 
statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. Please refer to Appendix 
B for a full description of all variables. 
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Table 3 
Differences in Means in Filing Date Abnormal Returns 
Panel A: Mean CAR(0,2)       
  Obs. Mean P-Value 
All 141,968 -0.1299 0.000*** 
No Footnote 80,433 -0.1460 0.000*** 
Footnote 61,535 -0.1089 0.000*** 
   Discretionary Footnote 60,020 -0.1117 0.000*** 
        10b5-1 Footnote 51,556 -0.1024 0.000*** 
        Other Discretionary 8,464 -0.1688 0.000*** 
   Nondiscretionary Footnote 1,515 0.0054 0.956 
Panel B: Differences in Means       
    Diff P-Value 
Footnote - No Footnote   0.0372 0.048** 
Discretionary Footnote - No Footnote   0.0343 0.070* 
10b5-1 Footnote - No Footnote   0.0436 0.028** 
Other Discretionary - No Footnote   -0.0227 0.548 
Nondiscretionary Footnote - No Footnote   0.1514 0.078* 
Discr. Footnote - Nondiscr. Footnote   -0.1171 0.232 
Other Discretionary - Nondiscr Footnote   -0.1742 0.070* 
Notes: This table provides results for univariate tests of means (Panel A) and differences in 
means (Panel B) for the different insider sale categories. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. Please 
refer to Appendix B for a full description of all variables.  
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Table 4 
Short-Term Filing Abnormal Returns 
  Full Sample   CEO/CFO 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                        
Discretionary Footnote -0.065     -0.055 -0.072   -0.148*     -0.068 -0.044 
  (0.043)     (0.064) (0.065)   (0.082)     (0.123) (0.123) 
Nondiscretionary Footnote 0.299***     0.438*** 0.483***   0.657***     0.679*** 0.701*** 
  (0.086)     (0.086) (0.088)   (0.158)     (0.174) (0.178) 
Discretionary Trade   -0.321**           -0.952***       
    (0.133)           (0.239)       
Discretionary FN vs.  
Nondiscretionary FN   -0.358**           -1.310***     
      (0.177)           (0.35)     
Book-to-market -0.604*** -0.642*** -0.719*** -0.703*** -0.755***   -0.834*** -0.860*** -0.868*** -0.861*** -0.873*** 
  (0.049) (0.056) (0.089) (0.044) (0.055)   (0.095) (0.117) (0.158) (0.100) (0.105) 
Size 0.186*** 0.162*** 0.176** 0.174*** 0.240***   0.150* 0.178* 0.403*** 0.282*** 0.306*** 
  (0.041) (0.048) (0.074) (0.033) (0.050)   (0.082) -0.105 (0.153) (0.090) (0.099) 
Debt-to-Assets -0.565*** -0.689*** -0.933*** -0.664*** -0.771***   -0.936*** -0.793* -0.994* -1.130*** -1.170*** 
  (0.172) (0.196) (0.305) (0.163) (0.198)   (0.333) (0.409) (0.579) (0.384) (0.400) 
Direct Ownership -0.076** -0.106** -0.230*** -0.084 -0.091   -0.077 -0.078 -0.128 -0.146 -0.133 
  (0.036) (0.043) (0.070) (0.056) (0.058)   (0.092) (0.123) (0.199) (0.132) (0.133) 
CEO/CFO-Indicator -0.064*** -0.059** -0.015 -0.007 0.007             
  (0.021) (0.025) (0.040) (0.060) (0.065)             
Tradesize 0.014** 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000*   0.000 -0.036* -0.044 0.000 0.000 
  (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.016) (0.021) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior Month Return -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.754*** -0.794***   -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -1.024*** -1.019*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.108) (0.109)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.221) (0.221) 
         (Continued on next page) 
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Table 4 
(continued) 
 
Fixed Effects                       
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm  Yes Yes Yes       Yes Yes Yes     
Manager       Yes           Yes   
Firm-Manager         Yes           Yes 
N 184,742 141,968 61,535 204,806 204,806   49,450 38,057 22,047 47,900 47,900 
Adj. R2 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006   0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007 
Notes: This table summarizes pooled OLS regression results for the relation between insider sales and cumulative abnormal announcement returns CAR(0,2). Discretionary Footnote 
is an indicator equal to one if the footnote on Form 4 relates to gift, retirement, family, 10b5-1 or options exercise trades. The variable is equal zero if a trade does not contain a 
footnote. Nondiscretionary Footnote is an indicator variable equal to one if the footnote on Form 4 relates to tax, error corrections, or automatic trades and equal zero if a trade does 
not contain a footnote. Discretionary Trade is an indicator equal to one if Discretionary Footnote is 1 or no footnote exists and equal to zero if a trade contained a Nondiscretionary 
Footnote. Discretionary FN vs. Nondiscretionary FN is an indicator equal to one if the footnote on Form 4 relates to gift, retirement, family, 10b5-1 or options exercise trades and 
zero if the footnote on Form 4 relates to tax, error corrections, or automatic trades. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level, respectively, based on 
two-tailed tests. Reported statistics are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm in columns (1)-(3) and (6)-(8), clustered by manager in columns (4) and (9) and clustered 
by firm-managers in columns (5) and (10). Please refer to Appendix B for a full description of all variables. 
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Table 5 
SOX Firm Size Thresholds  
  Full Sample   CEO/CFO 
  <75m 75-250m >250m   <75m 75-250m >250m 
                
Discretionary Footnote  -0.382 -0.281 -0.071   -0.910 -0.450 -0.155* 
 (ex 10b5-1) (0.540) (0.174) (0.047)   (0.993) (0.427) (0.088) 
 
Nondiscretionary 
Footnote 2.100** 0.703* 0.217**   6.503*** 1.909** 0.459*** 
  (1.014) (0.409) (0.095)   (1.384) (0.761) (0.173) 
10b5-1 -0.290 -0.112 0.047   0.689 -0.052 0.091 
  (0.334) (0.143) (0.033)   (0.921) (0.234) (0.074) 
               
Controls Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Firm FE Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
N 4,645 17,976 127,989    1,042 4,951 36,160 
Adj. R2 0.007 0.005 0.004   0.034 0.013 0.005 
Notes: This table summarizes pooled OLS regression results for the relation between insider sales and cumulative abnormal 
announcement returns CAR(0,2). Discretionary Footnote is an indicator equal to one if the footnote on Form 4 relates to gift, 
retirement, family, options exercise trades. The variable is equal to zero if a trade does not contain a footnote. Nondiscretionary 
Footnote is an indicator variable equal to one if the footnote on Form 4 relates to tax, error corrections, or automatic trades and 
equal to zero if a trade does not contain a footnote. 10b5-1 is an indicator equal to one if the footnote on Form 4 refers to a 10b5-
1 trade and equal to zero if a trade does not contain a footnote.  ***, **, * denotes statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10%-
level, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. Reported statistics are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. 
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Table 6 
Long-Term Abnormal Returns 
Panel A: Discretionary Footnote and Trade Indicator  
  Dependent Variable = BHAR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  1 Month 3 Months 12 Months 1 Month 3 Months 12 Months 
Discretionary Trade    -0.221** -0.426*         -2.141***       
  (0.107) (0.230)    (0.507)       
Nondiscretionary Trade            1.132***      1.742**   1.927       
  (0.347) (0.739)    (0.507)       
Discretionary Footnote               -0.287***         -0.633***   -0.690 
           (0.102)    (0.230)    (0.563) 
Nondiscretionary Footnote                1.172***        1.804**      2.727* 
           (0.347)    (0.730)    (1.558) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm & Month FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 79,356 79,356 76,936 79,356 79,356 76,936 
Adj. R2 0.012 0.030 0.190 0.012 0.030 0.190 
Panel B: Net Discretionary Footnote and Trade Count 
  Dependent Variable = BHAR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  1 Month 3 Months 12 Months 1 Month 3 Months 12 Months 
Net Discretionary Trade Count      -0.734***      -1.375***      -2.555***       
  (0.100) (0.215) (0.481)       
              
Net Discretionary Footnote Count            -0.720***      -1.610***      -2.273*** 
        (0.164) (0.361) (0.824) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm & Month FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 65,585 65,585 63,517 28,832 28,832 27,687 
Adj. R2 0.013 0.031 0.189 0.016 0.025 0.182 
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Table 6 
(continued) 
Panel C: Monthly Calendar-Time Portfolio Returns 
 Nondiscretionary (long) - Discretionary (short) 
  Full Sample   CEO/CFO 
Avg. Return 0.86**     1.25** 
Fama-French Alpha 0.78**   1.15* 
Carhart Alpha 0.81**     1.23** 
N 101   101 
 
Notes: Panel A and B in this table summarize pooled OLS regression results for the relation between insider sales and buy-and-hold abnormal returns over different 
holding periods. Discretionary Trade is equal to one if a given month contains at least one discretionary trade (i.e., a sale for which the footnote on Form 4 relates to 
gift, retirement, family, 10b5-1 or options exercise trades or for which the Form does not contain a footnote). Nondiscretionary Trade is equal to one if a given month 
contains at least one nondiscretionary trade (i.e., a sale for which the footnote on Form 4 relates to tax, error corrections, or automatic trades). Discretionary Footnote 
is equal to one if a given month contains at least one insider sale with a footnote on Form 4 that relates to gift, retirement, family, 10b5-1 or options exercise trades. 
Nondiscretionary Footnote is equal to one if a given month contains at least one insider sale with a footnote on Form 4 that relates to tax, error corrections, or automatic 
trades. Net Discretionary Trade/Footnote Count is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the net number of discretionary trades/footnotes.  All footnote indicators 
should be interpreted relative to the benchmark of no footnote disclosure.  Panel C summarizes calendar-time portfolio average monthly (excess) returns of a trading 
strategy that in each month during the sample period buys stocks that have had insider sales with nondiscretionary footnotes and sells stocks that have had insider sales 
with discretionary footnotes and holds the portfolio over the next month. All regressions in Panel A and Panel B include control variables as in Table 4 as well as firm- 
and month-fixed effects. Additionally, we also included the prior year buy-and-hold return. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level, 
respectively, based on two-tailed tests. Reported statistics are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. Please refer to Appendix B for a full description of all 
variables.  
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Table 7 
Repeated Discretionary Trades 
  Dependent Variable = BHAR 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  <25%  25-75% >75% 
              
Discretionary Trade 0.000   -0.001   -0.005   
  (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.004)   
Nondiscretionary Trade 0.010   0.060*   0.147***   
  (0.006)   (0.031)   (0.055)   
Discretionary Footnote   -0.002**   -0.014***   -0.016*** 
    (0.001)   (0.003)   (0.006) 
Nondiscretionary Footnote   0.009   0.055*   0.147*** 
    (0.006)   (0.032)   (0.055) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Manager & Month Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 157,297   157,297  153,618 153,618    146,954 146,954 
Adj. R2 0.015 0.015 0.025 0.026 0.138 0.136 
Notes: This Table summarizes the results of the pooled OLS regression for the relation between insider sales and buy-and-hold abnormal returns partitioned by the 
percentage of a manager’s stock sales that contained a discretionary footnote of all the manager’s trades. Discretionary Trade is equal to one if a given month contains at 
least one discretionary trade (i.e., a sale for which the footnote on Form 4 relates to gift, retirement, family, 10b5-1 or options exercise trades or for which the Form does 
not contain a footnote). Nondiscretionary Trade is equal to one if a given month contains at least one nondiscretionary trade (i.e., a sale for which the footnote on Form 4 
relates to tax, error corrections, or automatic trades). Discretionary Footnote is equal to one if a given month contains at least one insider sale with a footnote on Form 4 
that relates to gift, retirement, family, 10b5-1 or options exercise trades. Nondiscretionary Footnote is equal to one if a given month contains at least one insider sale with 
a footnote on Form 4 that relates to tax, error corrections, or automatic trades. All footnote indicators should be interpreted relative to the benchmark of no footnote 
disclosure. All regressions include control variables as in Table 4 as well as manager and month-fixed effects. Additionally, we also included the prior year buy-and-hold 
return. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. Reported statistics are based on standard errors 
that are clustered by firm. Please refer to Appendix B for a full description of all variables. 
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Table 8 
Analyst Recommendation Downgrades and Negative Earnings Surprises 
Panel A: Analyst Recommendation Downgrades (Tobit Regressions) 
  Dependent Variable = Weighted Consensus Downgrade 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  6 Months 12 Months 18 Months 6 Months 12 Months 18 Months 
Discretionary Footnote 0.025** 0.022** 0.030***       
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)       
              
Nondiscretionary Footnote -0.007 -0.016 -0.018       
  (0.034) (0.029) (0.028)       
              
Net Discretionary Footnote Count            0.028**        0.039***       0.034*** 
        (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 58,559 65,954 68,179 22,440 24,731 25,294 
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.008 0.011 0.007 0.010 0.012 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 8  
(continued) 
Panel B: Negative Earnings Surprise Tobit Regressions   
  Dependent Variable = EA Missed Weighted 
  Fiscal Year   4 Quarters Ahead 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Discretionary Footnote -0.021     0.063   
   (0.036)     (0.050)   
            
Nondiscretionary Footnote -0.143     -0.095     
   (0.104)     (0.120)   
            
Net Discretionary Footnote Count     0.101*         0.161** 
    (0.057)     (0.080) 
Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Month FE  Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
N 77,988 27,811   41,075 14,813 
Pseudo R2 0.018 0.021   0.013 0.012 
Notes: This table provides logit regression results for the relation between insider sales and analyst consensus recommendation downgrades (Panel A) and 
negative earnings surprises (Panel B). The dependent variable in Panel A is an indicator equal to one if the consensus recommendation for the firm in the 6, 12, 
and 18 months after the insider trade month is lower than the consensus recommendation in the equivalent time period before the insider trade month weighted 
by the magnitude of the downgrade. The dependent variable in Panel B is an indicator equal to one if the firm missed its analyst consensus earnings forecast 
for the closest fiscal year end and for the four quarters after the insider trade month weighted by the magnitude of the earnings miss.  Discretionary Footnote 
is equal to 1 if a given month contains at least one insider sale with a footnote on the Form 4 that relates to gift, retirement, family, 10b5-1 or options exercise 
trades. Nondiscretionary Footnote is equal to 1 if a given month contains at least one insider sale with a footnote on the Form 4 that relates to tax, error 
corrections, or automatic trades.  Net Discretionary Trade/Footnote Count is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the net number of discretionary 
trades/footnotes. All regressions include Direct Ownership, Tradesize, Debt-to-Assets, Size, ROA, ln(Book-to-Market), Prior Month Return, BHAR(-2,-12) 
and a CEO/CFO-Indicator as well as month fixed effects as control variables. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level, 
respectively, based on two-tailed tests. Reported statistics are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. Please refer to Appendix B for a full description 
of all variables. 
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Table 9 
Future Litigation 
 Dependent Variable = Litigation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Discretionary Trade  0.006***        
  (0.002)       
Nondiscretionary Trade -0.014**       
  (0.006)       
Discretionary Footnote   0.005***     
    (0.002)     
Nondiscretionary Footnote   -0.015***     
    (0.006)     
Net Discretionary Trade Count     0.004**   
      (0.002)   
Net Discretionary Footnote Count       0.004* 
        (0.002) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 79,356 79,356 65,870 28,411 
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.078 0.080 0.061 
Notes: This table presents logit regression results for the relation between insider sales and future class action 
lawsuits. The dependent variable Litigation is equal to one if litigation is initiated between one and 24 
months after the insider trading month. Discretionary Trade is equal to one if a given month contains at least 
one discretionary trade (i.e., a sale for which the footnote on Form 4 relates to gift, retirement, family, 10b5-
1 or options exercise trades or for which the Form does not contain a footnote). Nondiscretionary Trade is 
equal to one if a given month contains at least one nondiscretionary trade (i.e., a sale for which the footnote 
on Form 4 relates to tax, error corrections, or automatic trades. Discretionary Footnote is equal to one if a 
given month contains at least one insider sale with a footnote on Form 4 that relates to gift, retirement, 
family, 10b5-1 or options exercise trades. Nondiscretionary Footnote is equal to one if a given month 
contains at least one insider sale with a footnote on Form 4 that relates to tax, error corrections, or automatic 
trades.  Net Discretionary Trade/Footnote Count is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the net number 
of discretionary trades/footnotes. All regressions include Direct Ownership, Tradesize, Debt-to-Assets, Size, 
ln(Book-to-Market), BHAR(-2,-12), a CEO/CFO-Indicator and month-fixed effects as control variables.  
***, **, * denotes statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level, respectively, based on two-tailed 
tests. Reported statistics are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. Please refer to Appendix B 
for a full description of all variables. 
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Table 10 
Robustness Tests 
Panel A: Discretionary vs Opportunistic Classification  
 Discretionary  
Opportunistic 0 1   
0 741 23,454 24,195 
1 303 7,699 8,002 
Total 1,044 31,153 32,197 
    
Panel B: Discretionary versus Opportunistic BHAR      
  Dependent Variable = BHAR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  1 Month 3 Months 12 Months 1 Month 3 Months 12 Months 
Discretionary Trade      -1.376***    -1.838**   -4.207**        
  (0.431) (0.907) (1.899)       
              
Discretionary Footnote             1.684***    -2.432** -3.680 
         (0.492) (1.130)    (2.500) 
              
Opportunistic Trade      -0.433***      -1.691***    -1.806**   -0.305*      -1.275***  0.450 
  (0.107) (0.289) (0.756)  (0.171) (0.489)   (1.261) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm & Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 67,583 67,583 65,422 30,541 30,541 29,314 
Adj. R2 0.013 0.031 0.189 0.016 0.023 0.179 
Difference Discretionary - Opportunistic           
  F 4.41 0.02 1.37 6.88 0.84 2.10 
  P-value 0.036 0.878 0.242 0.009 0.359 0.147 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 10 
(continued) 
Notes: Panel A in this table presents the frequency of insider sales per firm-month classified as opportunistic according to Cohen et al. (2012) classification 
and discretionary according to the classification in this paper. Panel B presents pooled OLS regression results for the relation between insider sales and buy-
and-hold abnormal returns over different holding periods. Discretionary Footnote is equal to one if a given month contains at least one insider sale with a Form 
4 footnote that relates to gift, retirement, family, 10b5-1 or options exercise trades. Discretionary Trade is equal to one if a given month contains at least one 
Discretionary Footnote trade or a trade without a Form 4 footnote. Opportunistic Trade is defined similar to Cohen et al. (2012) and is equal to one if the month 
of the insider trade is preceded by insider trades in the past two years during the same month by the same firm. Net Discretionary Opportunistic Trade Count 
is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the net number of opportunistic trades in any given month. All regressions include control variables as in Table 8.  
***, **, * denotes statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. Reported statistics are based on standard errors 
that are clustered by firm. Please refer to Appendix B for a full description of all variables. 
 
